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Abstract
We introduce a new threshold model of social networks, in which the
nodes influenced by their neighbours can adopt one out of several alterna-
tives. We characterize social networks for which adoption of a product by the
whole network is possible (respectively necessary) and the ones for which a
unique outcome is guaranteed. These characterizations directly yield poly-
nomial time algorithms that allow us to determine whether a given social
network satisfies one of the above properties.
We also study algorithmic questions for networks without unique out-
comes. We show that the problem of determining whether a final network
exists in which all nodes adopted some product is NP-complete. In turn, we
also resolve the complexity of the problems of determining whether a given
node adopts some (respectively, a given) product in some (respectively, all)
network(s).
Further, we show that the problem of computing the minimum possible
spread of a product is NP-hard to approximate with an approximation ratio
better than Ω(n), in contrast to the maximum spread, which is efficiently
computable. Finally, we clarify that some of the above problems can be
solved in polynomial time when there are only two products.
1 Introduction
1.1 Background
Social networks have become a huge interdisciplinary research area with important
links to sociology, economics, epidemiology, computer science, and mathematics.
A flurry of numerous articles, notably the influential [21], and recent books, see
∗A preliminary version of this paper appeared as [2].
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[7, 13, 28, 17, 10] shows the growing relevance of this field. It deals with such
diverse topics as epidemics, spread of certain patterns of social behaviour, effects
of advertising, and emergence of ‘bubbles’ in financial markets.
A large part of research on social networks focusses on the problem of dif-
fusion, that is the spread of a certain event or information over the network, for
example becoming infected or adopting a given product. In the remainder of the
paper, we will use as a running example the adoption of a product, which is being
marketed over a social network.
Two prevalent models have been considered for capturing diffusion: the thresh-
old models introduced in [15] and [23] and the independent cascade models studied
in [11]. In the threshold models, each node i has a threshold θ(i) ∈ (0,1] and it
decides to adopt a product when the total weight of incoming edges from nodes
that have already adopted a product exceeds the threshold. In a special case a node
decides to adopt a new product if at least the fraction θ(i) of its neighbours has
done so. In some cases the threshold may also depend on the specific product
under consideration. In the cascade models, each node that adopts a product can
activate each of his neighbours with a certain probability and each node has only
one chance of activating a neighbour1 .
Most of research has focussed on the situation in which the players face the
choice of adopting a specific product or not. The algorithmic problem of choosing
an initial set of nodes so as to maximize the adoption of a given product were stud-
ied initially in [9] and [18]. Certain variants and generalizations of this problem
were also studied in several publications that followed, e.g., [8, 12, 22].
When studying social networks from the point of view of adopting new prod-
ucts it is natural to lift the restriction of one product. One natural example of such
a situation is when users can adopt one out of several competing products (for ex-
ample providers of mobile telephones). Then, because of lower subscription costs,
each owner of a mobile telephone naturally prefers that his friends choose the same
provider. Another example is when children have to choose a secondary school.
Here, again, children prefer to choose a school which their friends will choose, as
well. Also, in discussions preceding voting in a small institution, for instance for
the position of a chairman of a club, preferences announced by some club members
may influence the votes cast by their friends.
What is common in these situations is that the number of choices is small in
comparison with the number of agents and the outcome of the adoption process
does not need to be unique. Indeed, individuals with a low ’threshold’ can adopt
1For the case of a single product, and when thresholds are assumed to be random variables, the
two models have been proved to be equivalent in the sense that they produce the same distribution
on outcomes [18].
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any product a small group of their friends adopts. As a result this model leads to
different considerations than the ones mentioned above.
Social networks in the presence of multiple products have been studied in a
number of recent papers. In the presence of multiple products, diffusion has been
investigated recently for the cascade model in [4, 6, 19]. In [19] a special case of
the cascade model is studied and NP-hardness results are obtained on finding the
best set of influential nodes in the presence of another competing product. In [4]
the authors also study a generalization to a cascade model with multiple products
and provide approximation algorithms for the problem of maximizing the influence
of a product given the initial adopters of the other products. Finally, in [6], the
authors provide approximation algorithms for certain variants of the problem with
two products.
For threshold models, an extension to two products has been recently proposed
in [5], where the authors examine whether the algorithmic approach of [18] can
be extended. Algorithms and hardness of approximation results are provided for
certain variants of the diffusion process. In line with [18], the authors of [5] also
assume that the threshold of each node is a random variable and the goal is to
maximize the expected spread.
Game theoretic aspects have also been considered in the case of two or more
products. In particular, the behavior of best response dynamics in infinite graphs is
studied in [21], when each node has to choose between two different products. An
extension of this model is studied in [16] with a focus on notions of compatibility
and bilinguality, i.e., having the option to adopt both products at an extra cost so as
to be compatible with all your neighbours. Other game theoretic approaches have
also been recently considered, by viewing the firms that market their products as
strategic agents, see [1, 14, 27].
1.2 Contributions
We study a new model of a social network in which nodes (agents) can choose out
of several alternatives and in which various outcomes of the adoption process are
possible. Our model combines a number of features present in various models of
networks and is a natural next step in this line of research.
It is a threshold model and we assume that the threshold of a node is a fixed
number as in [8] (and unlike [18, 5], where they are random variables). This is in
contrast to Hebb’s model of learning in networks of neurons, the focus of which
is on learning, leading to strengthening of the connections (here thresholds). In
our context, the threshold should be viewed as a fixed ‘resistance level’ of a node
to adopt a product. Contrary to the SIR model, see, e.g., [17], in which a node
can be in only two states, in our model each node can choose out of several states
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(products). We also allow that not all nodes have exactly the same set of products
to choose from, e.g. due to geographic or income restrictions some products may
be available only to a subset of the nodes. If a node changes its state from the initial
one, the new state (that corresponds to the adopted product) is final, as is the case
with most of the related literature.
Our work consists of two parts. In the first part (Sections 3, 4, 5) we study three
basic problems concerning this model, motivated by the nondeterministic character
of the adoption process. In particular, we find necessary and sufficient conditions
for determining whether
• a specific product will possibly be adopted by all nodes,
• a specific product will necessarily be adopted by all nodes,
• the adoption process of the products will yield a unique outcome.
For each of these questions, we obtain a characterization with respect to prop-
erties of the underlying graph. Furthermore, our characterizations yield efficient
algorithms for solving each problem. We also identify a natural class of social
networks that yield a unique outcome.
In the second part (Section 6) we investigate the complexity of various other
algorithmic problems concerning the adoption process. We start with the problem
of determining whether, given an initial network, a final network exists in which all
nodes adopted a product. Then we move on to questions regarding the behaviour
of a given node in terms of adopting a given product or some product in some (re-
spectively, all) network(s). We also study the problems of computing the minimum
(respectively, maximum) possible spread of a product.
We resolve the complexity of all these problems. Some of them turn out to be
efficiently solvable, whereas the remaining ones are either co-NP-complete or have
strong inapproximability properties. We also show that some, but not all, of these
problems can be solved in polynomial time when there are only two products.
Finally, in Section 7 we explain how one can transform social networks into
ones that are in some sense simpler, at the cost of addition of new nodes. These
transformations clarify the conciseness hidden in the initial definition and relate it
to the one used in [2], in which the threshold functions were product independent.
2 Preliminaries
Assume a fixed weighted directed graph G = (V,E,w) (with no parallel edges and
no self-loops), with n = |V | and wi j ∈ [0,1] being the weight of edge (i, j). In
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our proposed algorithms we shall assume that we are given the adjacency matrix
representation of the graph. Some of our algorithms use the adjacency lists repre-
sentation, which can be easily obtained from the adjacency matrix in time O(n2).
Given a node i of G we denote by N(i) the set of nodes from which there is an
incoming edge to i. We call each j ∈ N(i) a neighbour of i in G. We assume that
for each node i such that N(i) 6= /0, ∑ j∈N(i) w ji ≤ 1.
Let P be a finite set of alternatives, that we call from now on products. By a
social network (from now on, just network) we mean a tuple (G,P, p,θ), where
p assigns to each agent i a non-empty set of products p(i)⊆P from which it can
make a choice. For i ∈ V and t ∈ p(i) the threshold function θ yields a value
θ(i, t) ∈ (0,1]. The threshold θ(i, t) should be viewed as agent i’s resistance level
to adopt product t. In some cases, the threshold function may not depend on the
product t. We will call such functions product independent and we will then use
θ(i) instead of θ(i, t) to denote the resistance of agent i.
The idea is that each node i is offered a non-empty set p(i) of products from
which it can make its choice. If p(i) is a singleton, say p(i) = {t}, the node adopted
the product t. Otherwise it can adopt a product t if the total weight of incoming
edges from neighbours that have already adopted t is at least equal to the threshold
θ(i, t). To formalize the problems that we want to study, we need first to introduce
a number of notions. Since G,P and θ are fixed, we often identify each network
with the function p.
Consider a binary relation → on networks. Denote by →∗ the reflexive, tran-
sitive closure of → . We call a reduction sequence p→∗ p′ maximal if for no p′′
we have p′→ p′′. In that case we will say that p′ is a final network, given the initial
network p.
Definition 2.1 Assume an initial network p and a network p′. We say that
• p′ is reachable (from p) if p→∗ p′,
• p′ is unavoidable (from p) if for all maximal sequences of reductions p→∗ p′′
we have p′ = p′′,
• p admits a unique outcome if some network is unavoidable from p. 
So a network is reachable if it can be reached by some sequence of → re-
ductions that starts with p, and it is unavoidable if it is reachable by a maximal
sequence of reductions and a unique outcome of the initial network p exists.
From now on we specialize the relation → . Given a social network p when
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N(i) 6= /0 we use the abbreviation A(t, i) (to stand for ”adoption condition for prod-
uct t by node i”) for the condition
∑
j∈N(i)|p( j)={t}
w ji ≥ θ(i, t)
and stipulate without loss of generality that A(t, i) holds when N(i) = /0.
Definition 2.2
• We write p1→ p2 if p2 6= p1 and for all nodes i, if p2(i) 6= p1(i), then
|p1(i)| ≥ 2 and for some t ∈ p1(i)
p2(i) = {t} and A(t, i) holds in p1.
• We say that node i in a network p
– adopted product t if p(i) = {t},
– can adopt product t if
t ∈ p(i) ∧ |p(i)| ≥ 2 ∧ A(t, i).

In particular, a node with no neighbours and more than one available product
can adopt any product that is a possible choice for it. As with most of the literature
on diffusion models, we also assume that an adoption decision is final. Once a node
decides to adopt a product, it cannot cancel its decision or switch later to another
product. In a follow up paper, [24], a game-theoretic framework is considered in
which the agents’ decisions are not final in the sense that they can switch to a more
attractive product than the current one.
So p1→ p2 holds if
• any node that adopted a product in p2 either adopted it in p1 or could adopt
it in p1,
• at least one node could adopt a product in p1 and adopted it in p2,
• the nodes that did not adopt a product in p2 did not change their product sets.
Note that each modification of the function p results in assigning to a node i a
singleton set. So if p1→∗ p2, then for all nodes i either p2(i) = p1(i) or p2(i) is a
singleton set.
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One can naturally incorporate in the reduction process an elimination of prod-
ucts that cannot be adopted. More precisely, given a network p and a node i,
suppose that for some product t ∈ p(i)
∑
j∈N(i)|t∈p( j)
w ji < θ(i, t).
Then t can never be adopted by node i. Call such a product t infeasible for i.
Clearly, at each state of the reduction process all infeasible products can be dis-
carded from the corresponding product sets p(i) without affecting the adoption
process (and hence without affecting our results). We therefore allow only adop-
tion steps in our model and no elimination steps.
One of the questions we are interested in is whether a product t can spread to
the whole network. We will denote this final network by [t], where [t] denotes the
constant function p such that p(i) = {t} for all nodes i.
Below, given a network (G,P, p,θ) and a product t ∈ P we denote by Gp,t the
weighted directed graph obtained from G by removing from it all edges to nodes i
with p(i) = {t}. So in Gp,t for all such nodes i we have N(i) = /0 and for all other
nodes the set of neighbours in Gp,t and G is the same.
If each weight w ji in the considered graph equals 1|N(i)| , then we call the cor-
responding network equitable. So in equitable networks the adoption condition
A(t, i) holds if at least the fraction θ(i, t) of the neighbours of i adopted in p prod-
uct t.
Example 2.3 As an example consider the equitable networks in Figure 1, where
P = {t1, t2} and where we mention next to each node the set of products available
to it. We assume in this example that the threshold function does not depend on the
product argument, hence we omit it.
Figure 1: Two examples of social networks
In the first network, if θ(a) ≤ 12 , then the network in which each node apart
from the one on the top left adopts product t2 is reachable, though not unavoidable.
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It is no longer a reachable network if θ(a) > 12 . In that case the initial network
admits a unique outcome. In this unique outcome, node b adopts product t2 if and
only if θ(b) ≤ 12 .
For the second network the following more elaborate case distinction lists the
possible values of p in the final reachable networks.
θ(a) ≤ 13 ∧ θ(b) ≤
1
2 : (p(a) = {t1}∨ p(a) = {t2}) ∧
(p(b) = {t1}∨ p(b) = {t2})
θ(a) ≤ 13 ∧ θ(b) >
1
2 : (p(a) = {t1} ∧ p(b) = P)∨
(p(a) = p(b) = {t2})
1
3 < θ(a) ≤
2
3 ∧ θ(b) ≤
1
2 : p(a) = p(b) = {t2}
1
3 < θ(a) ∧ θ(b) >
1
2 : p(a) = p(b) = P
2
3 < θ(a) ∧ θ(b) ≤
1
2 : p(a) = P ∧ p(b) = {t2}
In particular, when 13 < θ(a) ≤
2
3 and θ(b) ≤
1
2 there is a unique reduction
sequence in which first node b adopts product t2 followed by node a adopting t2. 
3 Reachable outcomes
We start with providing necessary and sufficient conditions for a product to be
adopted by all nodes. We shall need the following notion.
Definition 3.1 Given a weighted directed graph G, a threshold function θ and a
product t, we will say that G is (θ , t)-well-structured if for some function level
that maps nodes to natural numbers, we have that for all nodes i such that N(i) 6= /0
∑
j∈N(i)|level( j)<level(i)
w ji ≥ θ(i, t). (1)
In other words, a weighted directed graph is (θ , t)-well-structured if levels can
be assigned to its nodes in such a way that for each node i such that N(i) 6= /0, the
sum of the weights of the incoming edges from lower levels is at least θ(i, t). We
will often refer to the function level as a certificate for the graph being (θ , t)-
well-structured. Note that there can be many certificates for a given graph. Note
also that (θ , t)-well structured graphs can have cycles. For instance, it is easy to
check that for every product t ∈ P the second network in Figure 1 is (θ , t)-well
structured when θ(i) ≤ 13 for every node i.
We provide now a structural characterization of graphs that allow products to
spread to the whole graph, given the threshold function θ . This will allow us to
efficiently determine whether a given product can spread to the whole network.
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Theorem 3.2 Assume a network (G,P, p,θ) and a product top ∈ P. The network
(G,P, [top],θ) is reachable from (G,P, p,θ) iff
• for all i, top ∈ p(i),
• Gp,top is (θ , top)-well-structured.
Proof.
(⇒ ) If for some node i we have top 6∈ p(i), then i cannot adopt product top and
[top] is not reachable.
To establish the second condition consider a reduction sequence
p1→ p2→ . . .→ pm
starting in p and such that pm = [top].
Assign now to each node i the minimal k such that pk+1(i) = {top}. We
claim that this definition of the level function shows that Gp,top is (θ , top)-well-
structured. To see this, consider a node i.
Case 1. level(i) = 0.
Then p(i) = {top}, and we have N(i) = /0 in Gp,top. Hence we do not need to
argue about node i, since we only need to ensure (1) for nodes with N(i) 6= /0.
Case 2. level(i)> 0.
Suppose that N(i) 6= /0 and that level(i) = k. By the definition of the reduction
→ the adoption condition A(top, i) holds in pk, i.e.,
∑
j∈N(i)|pk( j)={top}
w ji ≥ θ(i, top).
But for each j∈N(i) such that pk( j)= {top}we have by definition level( j)<
level(i). So (1) holds.
(⇐ ) Consider a certificate function level showing that Gp,top is (θ , top)-well-
structured. Without loss of generality we can assume that the nodes in Gp,top such
that N(i) = /0 are exactly the nodes of level 0. We construct by induction on the
level m a reduction sequence p→∗ p′′, such that for all nodes i we have top ∈ p′′(i)
and for all nodes i of level ≤ m we have p′′(i) = {top}.
Consider level 0. By definition of Gp,top, a node i is of level 0 iff it has no
neighbours in G or p(i) = {top}. In the former case, by the first condition, top ∈
p(i). So p→∗ p′′, where the function p′′ is defined by
p′′(i) :=
{
{top} if level(i) = 0
p(i) otherwise
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This establishes the induction basis. Suppose now that the claim holds for
some level m, yielding the reduction sequence p→∗ p′. Consider the nodes of
level m+1. For each such node i we have top ∈ p′(i), N(i) 6= /0 and
∑
j∈N(i)|level( j)<level(i)
w ji ≥ θ(i, top).
By the definition of Gp,top the sets of neighbours of i in G and Gp,top are the
same. By the induction hypothesis for all nodes j such that level( j) < level(i)
we have p′( j) = {top}. Hence, either such a node i adopted product top in p′ or
can adopt product top in p′.
Thus, p′→∗ p′′, where the function p′′ is defined by
p′′(i) :=
{
{top} if level(i) = m+1
p′(i) otherwise
Consequently p→∗ p′′, which establishes the induction step. By induction we
conclude p→∗ [top]. 
Next we show that testing if a graph is (θ , t)-well-structured can be efficiently
solved.
Theorem 3.3 Given a weighted directed graph G, a threshold function θ and a
product t, we can decide whether G is (θ , t)-well-structured in time O(n2).
Proof. We claim that the following simple algorithm achieves this:
• Given a weighted directed graph G, first assign level 0 to all nodes with
N(i) = /0. If no such node exists, output that the graph is not (θ , t)-well-
structured.
• Inductively, at step i, assign level i to each node for which condition (1)
from Definition 3.1 is satisfied when considering only its neighbours that
have been assigned levels 0, . . ., i−1.
• If by iterating this all nodes are assigned a level, then output that the graph is
(θ , t)-well-structured. Otherwise, output that G is not (θ , t)-well-structured.
The above algorithm can be implemented in time O(n2 + |E|) = O(n2). We
can first create the adjacency list representation so that for each node we have
a list with its outgoing edges. Given this representation, we can implement the
steps of the algorithm in O(|E|) time. The idea is that each edge of the graph is
processed only once and only a constant number of operations is needed for every
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edge. Indeed, one can keep a counter for every node that sums up the weight from
nodes that have already been assigned a level. For every node that was assigned
a level at the previous round, one can go through its outgoing edges and update
the corresponding counters accordingly (only counters of nodes that have not yet
been assigned a level are updated). Hence we can assign a level number to any
node whose counter has been updated at the current round and has exceeded the
threshold.
To prove the correctness of the algorithm, note that if the input graph is not
(θ , t)-well-structured, then the algorithm will output No, as otherwise, at termina-
tion it would have constructed a level function for a non-(θ , t)-well-structured
graph. Hence it remains to prove that if a graph is (θ , t)-well-structured, the algo-
rithm will output Yes.
Suppose a graph G is (θ , t)-well-structured. We will use a certificate function,
lG, in which all nodes are assigned the minimum possible level. For each node i,
let li be a certificate function where node i has the minimum possible level. Then
define lG(i) := min j l j(i) = li(i).
First note that lG is a certificate function because a minimum of certificate
functions is also a certificate for G. By the definition of lG, the level of each node i
cannot be lowered below lG(i), i.e., for all nodes i
lG(i) = min{k : ∑
j∈N(i)|lG( j)<k
w ji ≥ θ(i, t)}. (2)
We now prove that every node is assigned a level by the algorithm and in partic-
ular that lG is the function level generated by the algorithm, hence the algorithm
outputs Yes. For level 0, note that by the minimality of lG and since θ(i, t) > 0 for
every i, the only nodes for which lG assigns 0 are all nodes i such that N(i) = /0.
But these are precisely the nodes that are assigned level 0 by the algorithm as well.
Suppose by induction that lG and level coincide on all nodes considered by
the algorithm in steps 1, . . .,k− 1, where k is a level used by lG. Then by the
construction of the algorithm and by (2), the algorithm assigns level k to all nodes
i such that lG(i) = k. Moreover, since k is used by lG, some new nodes are assigned
a level at step k.
Hence, lG and level coincide. Consequently the algorithm assigns a level to
all nodes and hence outputs Yes. 
Note 3.4 The above algorithm can run in time O(|E|) when we are given directly
the representation of the graph in terms of adjacency lists of outgoing edges for
each node instead of the adjacency matrix.
Finally, we end this section by observing that the algorithmic question of de-
termining whether a network [top] is reachable can be solved efficiently.
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Theorem 3.5 Assume a network (G,P, p,θ) and a product top∈ P. There is an al-
gorithm running in time O(n2) that determines whether the network (G,P, [top],θ)
is reachable.
Proof. The proof follows either by using Theorem 3.2 and Theorem 3.3 for Gp,top
or by simply start performing adoptions only of product top until no further reduc-
tion is possible. 
4 Unavoidable outcomes
Next, we focus on the notion of unavoidable outcomes. We establish the following
characterization.
Theorem 4.1 Assume a network (G,P, p,θ) and a product top ∈ P. A network
(G,P, [top],θ) is unavoidable iff
• for all i, if N(i) = /0, then p(i) = {top},
• for all i, top ∈ p(i),
• Gp,top is (θ , top)-well-structured.
To prove this, we shall need first a few lemmas.
Lemma 4.2 Suppose that p→∗ p′ and for some node i we have p′(i) = {t}. Then
for some node j such that N( j) = /0 or p( j) is a singleton, we have t ∈ p( j).
Intuitively, this means that for each product eventually adopted by some node, the
diffusion of the product must have started by some node j (possibly different) such
that either j had already adopted it or the product was a possible choice for j in the
beginning of the sequence and j has no neighbors.
Proof. Let p→∗ p′ be of the form
p1→ p2→ . . .→ pm.
Let l′ be the smallest index l such that for some node j we have pl( j) = {t}. If
l′ = 1, then p( j) = {t} and we are done. If l′ > 1 then by the choice of l′ we have
N( j) = /0, as otherwise for some node k we would have pl′−1(k) = {t} (recall that
θ(i, t) 6= 0 for all i, t and that for nodes that have a non-empty neighborhood, the
only way to adopt a product is through their neighbors). Moreover, t ∈ pl′−1( j)
implies t ∈ p1( j), that is t ∈ p( j). 
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Lemma 4.3 Assume a network (G,P, p,θ) and a product top ∈ P. Suppose that
• for all i, if N(i) = /0 or p(i) is a singleton, then p(i) = {top}.
Then (G,P, p,θ) admits a unique outcome.
Intuitively, this means that if initially only one product can be adopted, then a
unique outcome of the network exists.
Proof. Consider two maximal sequences of reductions p→∗ p′ and p→∗ p′′. Let
p→∗ p′ be of the form
p1→ p2→ . . .→ pm.
We prove by induction on k that for all nodes i and products t if pk(i) = {t}, then
p′′(i) = {t}. If p(i) = {t}, then also p′′(i) = {t}. This takes care of the induction
basis.
Assume the claim holds for some k and suppose pk+1(i) = {t}. If pk(i) = {t},
then by the induction hypothesis p′′(i) = {t}. Otherwise by the definition of the
→ relation t ∈ pk(i), N(i) 6= /0 and A(t, i) holds in pk.
By the assumption and Lemma 4.2 t = top. By the induction hypothesis A(t, i)
holds in p′′.
Moreover, pk+1(i) = {top} implies top ∈ p(i). By the assumption and Lemma
4.2 for no t ′ 6= top we have p′′(i) = {t ′}. Hence any maximal sequence of reduc-
tions from p′′ will lead to a network p#, with p#(i) = {top}. But p→∗ p′′ is a
maximal sequence of reductions, so p# = p′′ and consequently p′′(i) = {top}.
We conclude by induction that for all nodes i if p′(i) = {t}, then p′′(i) = {t}.
By symmetry the reverse implication holds. By the definition of the → relation
this implies that p′ = p′′. 
Proof of Theorem 4.1
(⇒ ) If [top] is unavoidable, then it is reachable from p, hence, thanks to Theorem
3.2 we only need to establish the first condition. But if for some node i such that
N(i) = /0 we have p(i) 6= {top}, then i can adopt a different product than top and
[top] cannot be unavoidable.
(⇐ ) By Theorem 3.2 [top] is reachable, so we only need to show that it is a unique
outcome. But this is guaranteed by Lemma 4.3. 
In analogy to Theorem 3.5, we also have the following simple fact.
Theorem 4.4 Assume a network (G,P, p,θ) and a product top∈ P. There is an al-
gorithm, running in time O(n2), that determines whether the network (G,P, [top],θ)
is unavoidable.
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5 Unique outcomes
Finally, we consider the question of when a network admits a unique outcome. In
the definition of the reduction relation → between networks we only stipulate that
some node adopts a product. In several situations the order in which nodes adopt
the products does not matter. So this definition can introduce a ‘spurious’ nonde-
terminism in the sense that all maximal reduction sequences still yield the same
outcome. One way to eliminate this spurious nondeterminism consists of employ-
ing a different form of reduction, that we call below fast, in which we stipulate that
all nodes that can adopt a product do so. A natural conjecture is then that a network
does not admit a unique outcome iff such a modified form of reduction eventually
yields a network in which a node can adopt more than one product. However, such
a conjecture is false. As an example consider the network in Figure 2.
Figure 2: An example of a network with a non-unique outcome, with P = {t1, t2}.
In this network such a fast reduction eventually yields a network in which node
c adopts product t2. However, there is also another reduction sequence which re-
sults in node c adopting product t1. To rectify this conjecture we introduce the
following concepts.
Definition 5.1 Given networks p, p′ based on the same graph we say that
• the reduction p→ p′ is fast if for each node i, if i can adopt a product in
p then i adopted a product in p′. Intuitively, p→ p′ is then a ‘maximal’
one-step reduction of p,
• node i can switch in p′ given p if i adopted t in p′ and for some t ′ 6= t
t ′ ∈ p(i) ∧ ∑ j∈N(i)|p′( j)={t ′}w ji ≥ θ(i, t ′),
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• p′ is ambivalent given p if it contains a node that either can adopt more than
one product or can switch in p′ given p. 
The definition of ambivalence above essentially describes the two reasons that
may cause a network not to admit a unique outcome. Note now that given the
network in Figure 2 after performing two fast reductions we obtain a final network
in which node c can switch to t1. So the notion of switching allowed us to find
out that the initial network does not admit a unique outcome. This is the case in
general. To formulate the general result we need one more notion.
Definition 5.2 By the contraction sequence of a network we mean the unique
reduction sequence p→∗ p′ such that
• each of its reduction steps is fast,
• either p→∗ p′ is maximal or p′ is the first network in the sequence p→∗ p′
that is ambivalent given p. 
We now formulate a characterization of networks that admit a unique outcome.
Theorem 5.3 A network admits a unique outcome iff its contraction sequence ends
in a non-ambivalent network.
Comparing this characterization to the original false conjecture we see that it
still employs the fast reduction but refers to a different ‘stopping criterion’ that also
takes into account the possibility of switching.
Proof.
(⇒ ) Suppose that a network p admits a unique outcome and assume by contra-
diction that the contraction sequence χ of p ends in an ambivalent network p′. If a
node in p′ can adopt two different products, then we get a contradiction. Otherwise
a node i′ in p′ can switch from a product t to a product t ′ 6= t.
Given a reduction sequence ξ that starts in p and a node i that adopted in it a
product t, but not initially (so not in p), we define a modified reduction sequence
in which this node can adopt a product but did not adopt any. This is done so as
to cancel all adoptions that led i′ to adopt t. To this end we set p′′( j) := p( j) for
every node j that adopted product t and every network p′′ from ξ and subsequently
remove from the resulting sequence the duplicate networks.
Since node i′ can switch from t to t ′, we have {t, t ′}⊆ p(i′), so on χ node i′ did
not adopt the product t initially. So the corresponding modification of χ w.r.t. node
i′ results in a reduction sequence that starts in p and in which node i′ can adopt
product t ′. So p admits two outcomes which yields a contradiction.
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(⇐ ) First, given a maximal reduction sequence ξ := p→∗ p′ we define its fast
run inductively by its length as follows. If p = p′, then p is the fast run of p→∗ p′.
Otherwise, ξ = p→ p1→∗ p′ for some network p1. Define a social network p2 as
follows:
p2(i) :=
{
{t} if i can adopt t in p and p′(i) = {t}
p(i) otherwise
We have then p→ p2 and p2→∗ p′. We define then the fast run of p→∗ p′ as the
concatenation of p→ p2 and the fast run of p2→∗ p′.
Intuitively, a fast run of a maximal reduction sequence p→∗ p′ yields the same
final result, p′, but by maximizing at each reduction step the number of nodes that
adopt a product.
Suppose now that the contraction sequence of a network p ends in a non-
ambivalent network and assume by contradiction that p admits two outcomes. So
two sequences of reductions ξ and ξ ′ exist that both start in p, are maximal, and
their final elements differ.
Let f r(ξ ) and f r(ξ ′) be the respective fast runs of ξ and ξ ′. By assumption at
least one of these two fast runs, say f r(ξ ), differs from the contraction sequence
χ of p. Let p′1 be the first network in the sequence χ in which a difference with
f r(ξ ) arises.
By assumption p′1 is non-ambivalent, so some fast reduction p′1→ p′ is part of
χ and a reduction p′1→ p′′ with p′ 6= p′′ is part of f r(ξ ). Since p′1→ p′ is a fast
reduction and f r(ξ ) is a fast run, the difference between p′ and p′′ arises due to the
fact that some node i adopted in p′ one product and in p′′ a different product. But
this means that p′1 is ambivalent, which is a contradiction. 
Theorem 5.3 yields a simple algorithm for testing whether a network has a
unique outcome.
Theorem 5.4 There exists a polynomial time algorithm, running in time O(n2 +
n|P|), that determines whether a network admits a unique outcome.
For all practical purposes we have |P| ≪ n, so the running time is in practice
O(n2).
Proof of Theorem 5.4. By Theorem 5.3 it suffices to determine whether the con-
traction sequence of a network p ends in a non-ambivalent social network. This
can be tested using the algorithm presented in Figure 3. The algorithm keeps per-
forming fast reductions until we realize that either a node can adopt two different
products or can switch from one product to another. If none of these happens then
we can safely conclude given Theorem 5.3 that the network has a unique outcome.
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Given a network (G,P, p,θ), the algorithm uses for each node j and each prod-
uct t ∈ p( j) a counter S j,t . The counter measures the accumulated weight from
incoming edges that have already adopted a product t.
Regarding the complexity of the algorithm, the initial part of producing the
required representation in Line 1 may take time up to O(n2) if we are given the
matrix representation or any other of the standard ways of representing a graph.
The initialization of the counters S j,t requires in the worst case O(n|P|). As for the
remaining part, the variable L maintains the set of nodes that adopted a product in
the last round (Lines 11 and 28). Each edge (i, j) is examined exactly once, just
after i adopts a product.
The number of operations that we need to perform for every edge is O(1) be-
cause we only need to update the appropriate counter S j,t and add j to the list R
(Lines 16-17). Furthermore, we also need to check for each such j whether it can
adopt more than one product. This can also be done while we update each counter
S j,t by having another counter that increases by one for every S j,t that exceeds the
threshold θ( j, t). In total, we do not need more than O(1) operations per edge and
therefore the total running time is O(n2 +n|P|+ |E|) = O(n2 +n|P|). 
It would be interesting to find a structural characterization of networks that
admit a unique outcome, as Theorem 5.3 only provides such a characterization in
terms of the contraction sequences. At this stage we only have the following result.
Corollary 5.5 Assume a network (G,P, p,θ) such that for all nodes i and products
t we have θ(i, t) > 12 ,
Then (G,P, p,θ) admits a unique outcome iff for all i, N(i) = /0 implies that
p(i) is a singleton.
Proof. The (⇒ ) implication is obvious. For the (⇐ ) implication it suffices to
note that if p→∗ p′, then p′ is not ambivalent given p. So the result is a direct
consequence of Theorem 5.3. 
This corollary can be strengthened by assuming that the network is such that if
for some product t we have θ(i, t) ≤ 12 , then |N(i)|< 2 or |p(i)|= 1. The reason is
that the nodes for which |N(i)|< 2 or |p(i)|= 1 cannot introduce an ambivalence.
When for some node i and product t, θ(i, t) ≤ 12 holds and neither |N(i)| < 2
nor |p(i)| = 1, the equitable network still may admit a unique outcome but it does
not have to. For instance the second network in Figure 1 admits a unique outcome
for the last three alternatives (explained in Example 2.3), while for the first two it
does not.
Finally, we note that for the class of networks of Corollary 5.5 we have a sim-
pler algorithm, removing the dependency on |P|.
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1: Produce the representation with a list of outgoing edges for each node;
2: for i ∈V do
3: Set p(i) to be the initial list of products available to node i;
4: end for
5: for j ∈V, t ∈ p( j) do
6: S j,t := 0; // counts total weight to j from nodes that adopted t
7: end for
8: if ∃i ∈V with N(i) = /0 and |p(i)| ≥ 2 then
9: return ”No unique outcome”;
10: end if
11: L := {i ∈ V : |p(i)| = 1}; // initialize L to a list of nodes that already have
adopted a product
12: if L = /0 return ”Unique outcome”; endif
13: while L 6= /0 do
14: R := /0;
15: for i ∈ L and j such that (i, j) ∈ E do
16: if i has adopted t and t ∈ p( j) then S j,t := S j,t +wi j; end if
17: R := R∪{ j}; // nodes we need to check for ambivalence
18: end for
19: for j ∈ R do
20: Compute |{t : S j,t ≥ θ( j, t)}|; // even for nodes that have already adopted
a product
21: if |{t : S j,t ≥ θ( j, t)}| ≥ 2 return ”No unique outcome”; endif
22: if |{t : S j,t ≥ θ( j, t)}| = 1 and j has not yet adopted t then
23: node j adopts product t;
24: else
25: R := R\{ j}; // node j does not adopt any product
26: end if
27: end for
28: L := R; // put in L all nodes that adopted a product in last round
29: end while
30: return ”Unique outcome” // No further reduction is possible
Figure 3: Pseudocode for the algorithm of Theorem 5.4
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Theorem 5.6 There exists an algorithm, running in time O(n2), that determines
whether a network, such that for all nodes i and products t we have θ(i, t) > 12 ,
admits a unique outcome.
Proof. By Corollary 5.5. 
6 Product adoption
In this section we study a number of questions concerning adoption of the products
by the nodes of a given network, focusing on complexity matters. Recall that given
an initial network p, a final network is one that has been obtained from p by a
maximal sequence of reductions. We first clarify the complexity of the following
problem.
FINAL: Given an initial network determine whether a final network exists in which
every node adopted some product.
Note that in the definition of the problem, we do not insist that all nodes adopt
the same product, but only that every node has eventually chosen a product.
Theorem 6.1 FINAL is NP-complete, even for 2 products and product indepen-
dent thresholds.
Proof. First we prove that FINAL is in NP. Given an initial network, the certificate
can consist of a final network in which every node adopted some product along
with the series of reductions that led to this final network (there can be at most
O(n) such reductions). One can then check in polynomial time that this is a valid
final network, given the initial network, and that indeed all nodes have adopted a
product.
For NP-hardness, we give a reduction from the NP-complete PARTITION
problem, which is: given n positive rational numbers (a1, . . .,an), is there a set
S such that ∑i∈S ai = ∑i6∈S ai? Consider an instance I of PARTITION. Without loss
of generality, suppose we have normalized the numbers so that ∑ni=1 ai = 12 . Hence
the question is to decide whether there is a set S such that ∑i∈S ai = ∑i6∈S ai = 14 .
We build an instance of our problem with two products, namely P = {t1, t2},
and with the network shown in Figure 4. The threshold function does not depend on
the product argument (that is omitted) and is given by: θ(a) = θ(b) = 34 . Finally,
for each node i ∈ {1, . . .,n}, we set wia = wib = ai. The weights of the other two
edges are 12 .
Suppose there is a solution S to I. Then we can have the nodes corresponding to
the set S adopt t1 and the remaining nodes from {1, . . .,n} adopt t2. By the choice
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Figure 4: Social network related to the FINAL problem, with P = {t1, t2}.
of the weights wia and wib this implies that node a can adopt t1 and node b can
adopt t2. Hence a final network exists in which all nodes adopted a product.
For the reverse direction, suppose that a final network exists in which all nodes
adopted a product. Then node a adopted product t1 and node b adopted product t2,
as it is not possible for node a to adopt t2 and for node b to adopt t1. Let S be the set
of nodes i ∈ {1, . . .,n} that adopted product t1. Then by the choice of the weights
wia and wib and the thresholds of the nodes a and b, it holds that both ∑i∈S ai ≥ 14
and ∑i6∈S ai ≥ 14 . But since ∑ni=1 ai = 12 , this implies that ∑i∈S ai = ∑i6∈S ai = 14 , i.e.,
there is a solution to the instance I of the PARTITION problem. 
We now move on to a different class of problems, motivated by the results
of Section 5, which reveal that many networks will not admit a unique outcome.
Therefore the following questions concerning product adoption by a given node
are of natural interest for such networks.
ADOPTION 1: (unavoidable adoption of some product)
Determine whether a given node has to adopt some product in all final networks.
ADOPTION 2: (unavoidable adoption of a given product)
Determine whether a given node has to adopt a given product in all final networks.
ADOPTION 3: (possible adoption of some product)
Determine whether a given node adopted some product in some final network.
ADOPTION 4: (possible adoption of a given product)
Determine whether a given node adopted a given product in some final network.
Below we resolve the complexity of all these problems.
Theorem 6.2 The complexity of the above problems is as follows:
(i) ADOPTION 1 is co-NP-complete, even for 2 products and product indepen-
dent thresholds.
(ii) ADOPTION 2 for 2 products can be solved in O(n2) time.
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(iii) ADOPTION 2 is co-NP-complete for at least 3 products, even with product
independent thresholds.
(iv) ADOPTION 3 can be solved in O(n2|P|) time.
(v) ADOPTION 4 can be solved in O(n2) time.
Proof.
(i) It suffices to prove NP-completeness of the complementary problem, which is:
given an initial network determine if there is a final network in which a given node
does not adopt any product. The argument for the membership in NP is very similar
to the membership proof in Theorem 6.1.
To prove NP-hardness, we use again a reduction from the PARTITION problem
but with a different normalization for the PARTITION instance. In particular, we
assume an instance I with the numbers a1, ...,an satisfying ∑ni=1 ai = 1. Hence
the question is to decide whether there is a set S such that ∑i∈S ai = ∑i6∈S ai = 12 .
We also use a slightly different network than the one depicted in Figure 4. Given
the instance I we use the network presented in Figure 5. This network depicts
an instance of our problem with P = {t1, t2} and with node c as the ”designated”
node. The threshold function does not depend on the product argument (that is
omitted) and is given by: θ(a) = θ(b) = 12 , and θ(c) = 1. Finally, as in the proof
of Theorem 6.1, for each node i ∈ {1, . . .,n}, we set wia = wib = ai. We also use
the weights wac = wbc = 12 .
Figure 5: Social network related to the ADOPTION 1 problem. Here P = {t1, t2}.
Suppose now that there is a solution S to the PARTITION instance. Then we
can have the nodes corresponding to the set S adopt t1 and the remaining nodes from
{1, . . .,n} adopt t2. By the choice of the weights wia and wib and the thresholds of
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a and b, this implies that node a can adopt t1 and node b can adopt t2. In that case
node c cannot adopt any product. Thus a final network exists in which node c does
not adopt any product.
Suppose now that in a final network node c did not adopt any product. Then it
cannot be the case that nodes a and b adopted the same product since then node c
would have adopted it as well. Note also that in all final networks nodes a and b
have adopted some product. Suppose without loss of generality that node a adopted
t1 and node b adopted t2. Let S be the set of nodes i ∈ {1, . . .,n} that adopted t1.
Then the nodes i ∈ {1, . . .,n} \ S adopted t2. By the choice of the weights we
have both ∑i∈S ai ≥ 12 and ∑i6∈S ai ≥ 12 . But since ∑ni=1 ai = 1, this implies that
∑i∈S ai = ∑i6∈S ai = 12 , i.e., there is a solution to the instance I of the PARTITION
problem.
(ii) The algorithm resembles the one used in the proof of Theorem 5.4. Let P =
{t1, t2}, and suppose the given product is t1. We use the following observation. To
determine whether a given node has to adopt t1 in all final networks, it suffices to
check this for the worst possible final network with respect to adoption of t1. So we
first perform fast reductions only for product t2. Once no further adoption of t2 is
possible, we perform all possible adoptions of t1 so as to reach a final network. If
in this final network, the given node has not adopted t1, the answer to ADOPTION
2 is No and otherwise the answer is Yes.
(iii) We provide a reduction from PARTITION but with a slightly more involved
network than in the proof of (i). Note that again, it suffices to prove NP-completeness
of the complementary problem, which is: given an initial network determine if
there is a final network in which a given node does not adopt the given product.
The argument for the membership in NP is straighforward.
To prove NP-hardness, we start again with a PARTITION instance I with the
numbers a1, ...,an satisfying ∑ni=1 ai = 1. From this we construct the network
shown in Figure 6. This network has 3 products, P = {t1, t2, t3}, the designated
node is e and the designated product is t3. The weights in the first layer of the
graph are as in (i). The rest of the weights are shown in the figure. The prod-
uct independent threshold function is given by θ(a) = θ(b) = θ(c) = θ(d) = 12 ,
θ(e) = 1/2+ ε , for some ε > 0.
Suppose there is a solution S to I. Then we can have the nodes corresponding
to the set S adopt t1 and the remaining nodes from {1, . . .,n} adopt t2. Then node a
can adopt t1 and node b can adopt t2. Subsequently, node c can adopt t1 and node
d can adopt t2. This yields a final network in which node e does not adopt product
t3.
Conversely, suppose that in a final network node e did not adopt product t3.
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Figure 6: Social network related to the ADOPTION 2 problem. We fix R= {t1, t2}.
Then neither node c nor node d adopted t3. Hence node c adopted t1 and node
d adopted t2 and consequently node a adopted t1 and node b adopted t2. As in
the proof of part (i) this implies that there is a solution to the instance I of the
PARTITION problem.
(v) The algorithm resembles the one used in the proof of Theorem 5.4. Given a
product, say t, it suffices to start with the nodes that have already adopted t, perform
fast reductions but only with respect to t until no further adoption of t is possible,
and check if the given node has adopted t.
(iv) Run the algorithm used in (v) for each product. 
It is interesting to observe the separation between ADOPTION 1 and ADOP-
TION 2 for |P| = 2. While for |P| ≥ 3 both problems are co-NP-complete and
the proofs are based on similar arguments, in the case that |P|= 2, ADOPTION 2
becomes efficiently solvable but ADOPTION 1 remains co-NP-complete.
We conclude our study by the following two optimization problems. Suppose
that a given product top is neither reachable by all nodes nor unavoidable for all
nodes. We would like then to estimate what is the worst and best-case scenario for
the spread of this product. That is, starting from a given initial network p, what is
the minimum (resp. maximum) number of nodes that will adopt this product in a
final network. Hence, the following two problems are of interest.
MIN-ADOPTION: Given an initial network and a product top, what is the mini-
mum number of nodes that adopted top in a final network.
MAX-ADOPTION: Given an initial network and a product top, what is the max-
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imum number of nodes that adopted top in a final network.
We show that these two problems are substantially different, the first being
essentially inapproximable, while the second being efficiently solvable.
Theorem 6.3 Suppose n is the number of nodes of a network.
(i) MAX-ADOPTION can be solved in O(n2) time.
(ii) MIN-ADOPTION for 2 products can be solved in O(n2) time.
(iii) For at least 3 products and even with product independent thresholds, it is NP-
hard to approximate MIN-ADOPTION with an approximation ratio better
than Ω(n).
Proof.
(i) The algorithm is analogous to the one used when analyzing the ADOPTION 4
problem in the proof of Theorem 6.2. Given a product t, we start with the nodes
that have already adopted the product and perform fast reductions but only with
respect to t until no further adoption of t is possible.
(ii) Suppose P = {t1, t2} and that t1 is the designated product. We first solve the
MAX-ADOPTION problem for product t2 and then perform any necessary adop-
tions of t1 to reach a final network. This yields a final network with the minimum
number of adoptions for product t1, since we only perform adoptions of t1 that are
necessary to reach a final network after first flooding the network as much as pos-
sible with the competitor. Note that this cannot be extended to the case of more
products because then the order in which the competitors of t1 spread may play
a crucial role for minimizing the adoptions of product t1. Hence it is not easy to
determine a priori the sequence of adoptions of the products competing t1.
(iii) We again give a reduction from PARTITION, though the appropriate network
is now more involved. Consider an instance I of PARTITION problem, so n pos-
itive rational numbers (a1, . . .,an) such that ∑ni=1 ai = 1. We build an instance of
our problem with 3 products, namely P = {t1, t2, t3}, and with the network shown
in Figure 7. Note that this is derived by adding to the network of Figure 6 a chain
of M nodes starting from node e. We take M to be nO(1) so that the reduction is of
polynomial time. The weight of each edge in the chain is set to 1.
We consider t3 as the designated product. The threshold function does not
depend on the product argument (that is omitted) and is given by: θ(a) = θ(b) =
θ(c) = θ(d) = 12 , θ(e) = 1/2+ ε , for some ε > 0 and for the nodes to the right of
node e we can set the thresholds to an arbitrary positive number in (0,1]. Finally,
for each node i ∈ {1, . . .,n}, we set wia = wib = ai. The weights of the other edges
can be seen in the figure.
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Figure 7: The graph of the reduction with P = {t1, t2, t3} and R = {t1, t2}.
We claim that if there exists a solution to the instance I, then a final network
exists with the number of nodes that adopted t3 equal to 3, and otherwise in all final
networks the number of nodes that adopted t3 equals M + 5. This claim directly
yields the desired result, since M = Ω(|V |).
Suppose there is a solution S to I. As in the proof of Theorem 6.2(iii) it follows
that there exists a final network in which node e did not adopt product t3. Hence a
final network exists in which only 3 nodes adopted t3.
For the reverse direction, suppose there is no solution to the PARTITION prob-
lem. This means that no matter how we partition the nodes {1, . . .,n}, into two sets
S,S′, it will always be that for one of them, say S, we have ∑i∈S ai > 12 , whereas for
the other we have ∑i∈S′ ai < 12 . Thus in each final network, no matter which nodes
from {1, . . .,n} adopted t1 or t2, the nodes a and b adopted the same product. Sup-
pose for example that nodes a and b both adopted t1 (the same reasoning applies if
they both adopted t2). This in turn implies that node c adopted t1 and node d did
not adopt t2. Thus, the only possibility for node d is to adopt t3. But then the only
choice for node e is to adopt t3 and this propagates along the chain starting from
node e. This completes the proof. 
7 Structural results
In [2] we used a slightly more restricted model of a social network in that the
threshold functions were product independent. We clarify here the relation be-
tween these two models by presenting two transformations of the social networks
25
considered here, to social networks with product independent threshold functions
and by explaining in which sense they are related.
The first transformation takes as input an arbitrary social network S :=(G,P, p,θ)
and produces an equitable social network with threshold functions that do not de-
pend on the product argument.
First we add a new product t0 to P. Then for each node i such that N(i) 6= /0
and |p(i)| ≥ 2 we remove the edges j → i for each node j ∈ N(i) and perform the
following steps for each product t ∈ p(i) and each minimal subset S of N(i) such
that ∑ j∈S|p( j)={t}w ji ≥ θ(i, t) :
• add a new node aS,t,i,
• put p(aS,t,i) := {t, t0} and θ(aS,t,i) := 1,
• add the edges j → aS,t,i for each node j ∈ S,
• add the edge aS,t,i → i,
• put θ(i) := 12|N(i)||p(i)| .
Call the resulting equitable network S ′. Intuitively, in this new network, a
node i can adopt a product t when t is adopted by any one of the nodes aS,t,i,
described above, which represent minimal subsets that can cause adoption. The
new product independent threshold of node i is set in a way that any such set S can
make node i adopt a product. Finally, we also need to add the product t0 to p(aS,t,i)
so that this node does not automatically adopt t.
The following result relates the networks S and S ′. We say here that p′0 is
an extension of a network p0 if it can be obtained from p0 by repeatedly replacing
an edge j → i by a set of edges { j → k,k → i | k ∈ Si, j}, where Si, j is a set of new
nodes, each with an appropriate set of products and a threshold function. p′0 is then
interpreted as an equitable network. We also say then that p0 is a restriction of p′0.
Theorem 7.1 Consider the networks S and S ′.
(i) If S →∗ p0 for a final network p0 given S , then for an extension p′0 of p0 we
have S ′→∗ p′0, where p′0 is a final network given S ′.
(ii) If S ′→∗ p′0 for a final network p′0 given S ′, then for a restriction p0 of p′0
we have S →∗ p0, where p0 is a final network given S .
Proof.
(i) Let i be the first node belonging to S and such that N(i) 6= /0, |p(i)| ≥ 2 and
i adopted a product t in the reduction sequence S →∗ p0. So for some subset S
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of N(i) we have ∑ j∈S|p( j)={t}w ji ≥ θ(i, t). Choose a minimal subset S with this
property. Then by the definition of the threshold functions in the network S ′ node
aS,t,i can adopt product t and subsequently node i can adopt t, as well. Repeating
this procedure we obtain the desired extension p′0 of p0.
(ii) Let i be the first node belonging to S such that N(i) 6= /0, |p(i)| ≥ 2 and i
adopted a product t in the reduction sequence S ′→∗ p′0. So product t was first
adopted in S ′ by some node aS,t,i and then by i. By the definition of the thresholds
functions in S ′ node i can adopt product t in the network S . Repeating this
procedure we obtain the desired restriction p0 of p′0. 
A disadvantage of this transformation is that it yields an exponential blow up
in the number of nodes. Indeed, S ′ has in the worst case n+n2n|P| nodes, where
n is the number of nodes in S .
A smaller increase can be achieved by the second transformation that takes as
input an equitable network S := (G,P, p,θ). First we add a new product t0 to P.
Then for each node i such that N(i) 6= /0 and |p(i)| ≥ 2 we remove the edges j → i
for each node j ∈ N(i) and perform the following steps for each product t ∈ p(i):
• add a new node at,i,
• put p(at,i) := {t, t0} and θ(at,i) := θ(i, t),
• add the edges j → at,i for each node j ∈ N(i),
• add the edge at,i → i,
• put θ(i) := 1|p(i)| .
Call the resulting network S ′. Note that S ′ has ≤ n(|P|+ 1) nodes, where
n is the number of nodes in S . The intuition behind this construction is simply
that, unlike the first transformation, we do not need to argue separately about each
minimal subset that can cause further adoptions. The following result relates the
networks S and S ′.
Theorem 7.2 Consider the equitable networks S and S ′.
(i) If S →∗ p0 for a final network p0 given S , then for some extension p′0 of p0
we have S ′→∗ p′0, where p′0 is a final network given S ′.
(ii) If S ′→∗ p′0 for a final network p′0 given S ′, then for a restriction p0 of p′0
we have S →∗ p0, where p0 is a final network given S .
Proof. The proof is analogous to that of Theorem 7.1 and omitted. 
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8 Conclusions and future work
We have introduced a diffusion model in the presence of multiple competing prod-
ucts and studied some basic questions. We have provided characterizations of the
underlying graph structure for determining whether a product can spread or will
necessarily spread to the whole network, and of the networks that admit a unique
outcome. We also studied the complexity of various problems that are of interest
for networks that do not admit a unique outcome, such as the problems of comput-
ing the minimum or maximum number of nodes that will adopt a given product in
a final network, or the problem of determining whether a given node has to adopt
some (resp. a given) product in all final networks.
Our model of a social network attempts to capture a realistic situation in which
customers can select out of a number of products and are influenced in their selec-
tion by their acquaintances and friends. Having this in mind it is useful to reflect
on some of our results from the viewpoint of a company trying to sell a specific
product. First, Theorem 6.3(iii) shows that the precise assessment of the worst
case scenario is computationally difficult. In contrast, the computation of the best
case scenario (item (i)) is easy. Next, Theorems 3.5 and 4.4 show that it is com-
putationally easy to check whether an adoption of a single product is possible or
unavoidable.
However, one should bear in mind that ‘computationally easy’ refers to the time
complexity O(n2) that can be too high for huge networks. Still such an analysis
may be useful for specialized networks, for instance those concerning choice of a
supermarket or a primary school in a neighbourhood.
We conclude by listing some further topics of recent and future work.
Game theoretic analysis A natural follow up to this work is a game theoretic
analysis that aims at predicting customer behaviour. Such an analysis for players
choosing between two products has been presented in [21]. An extension with the
additional option of adopting both products has also been considered in [16] (e.g.
choosing to have two operating systems in your PC, instead of just one).
Recently [24], and more fully [25], used the model introduced here to study
consequences of adopting products by the nodes forming a social network. This
led to a study of strategic games in which the nodes decide which product to choose
(or decide not to adopt any). In particular, deciding whether a game in this class
has a pure Nash equilibrium is NP-complete, while deciding whether a game has
the so-called finite improvement property is co-NP-hard.
Other game-theoretic approaches can also be considered based on our model.
In particular, one can consider a strategic game between the producers who decide
to offer their products for free to some selected nodes. A limited case was studied
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in [1] (see also [26]) in a simpler model in which the thresholds were all equal to
1/|N(v)| for every node v (i.e., one neighbor suffices to infect you). Some recent
follow up works on richer models include [14] and [27]. An interesting direction
here is to obtain a better understanding of the structure of Nash equilibria (pure or
mixed), or identify conditions that guarantee the existence of pure equilibria.
Introducing new products When a new product is introduced in a market, it
is natural to assume that this takes place when various customers have already
adopted some other product. The issue is then whether some nodes would switch
to the new product. The present model does not allow us to study such a problem
since the input network for such an analysis is already a final network and we
stipulate that the choices of the nodes are final. Allowing a switching by a node to
a new product can result in an ‘illegal’ network, in which choices of some nodes
are not anymore justified and have to be reconsidered.
In contrast, in the framework of [24] and [25] such a study is possible, since the
input is simply a strategy profile that is an assignment of products to nodes (with
a special ‘no-choice’ strategy allowed). Recently we studied in this setting, in [3],
the consequences of introducing new products by means of improvement paths in
the sense of [20], the special case of which is the best-response dynamics.
Analysis for specific networks Regarding the results of Section 6, it would be
interesting to see if the negative results can be alleviated by studying special cases
of networks. One example is to find classes of graphs for which we can have effi-
cient constant factor approximation algorithms for the MIN-ADOPTION problem.
We are also not yet aware if the same hardness results hold for equitable networks.
Finally, it would be interesting to study such problems for graphs that resemble real
networks with respect to degree distribution or other graph theoretic properties.
Optimizing the spread of a product Given a diffusion model, one important
problem, especially in the context of viral marketing is: given a network (G,P, p,θ),
a product t ∈ P, and k ≥ 0, we wish to find the optimal set S of nodes, under the
restrictions that |S| ≤ k and t ∈ p(i) for i ∈ S, such that if we give the product t to
the members of S, optimal spread is achieved.
The parameter k indicates a bound on the budget for the company’s advertising
campaign. This problem was initially studied for the case of a single product, and
when the thresholds are random variables in [18] (as noted in [18], when thresholds
are fixed numbers strong inapproximability results hold). For the threshold model,
some extensions to the case of two products appeared in [5], where various options
on how nodes decide when choosing between two products have been proposed.
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The algorithmic challenge here is to compute the optimal set given that the oppo-
nents have already chosen their seed sets. In most cases, the techniques of [18]
cannot be applied and algorithmic results are still elusive. It would be interesting
to make further progress on this for multiple products.
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